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ABSTRACT 
The numerous advantages offered by cloud computing has fuelled its growth and 
has made it one of the most significant of current computing trends. The same 
advantages have created complex issues for those conducting digital forensic 
investigations. Digital forensic investigators rely on the ACPO (Association of 
Chief Police Officers) or similar guidelines when conducting an investigation, 
however the guidelines make no reference to some of the issues presented by 
cloud investigations. This study investigates the impact of cloud computing on 
ACPO’s core principles and asks whether these principles can still be applied in a 
cloud investigation and the challenges presented thereof. We conclude that the 
ACPO principles can generally be upheld but that additional precautions must be 
taken throughout the investigation.  
Keywords: ACPO, Evidence, Investigation, Cloud computing, Digital 
Investigation Guidelines 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing has generally received considerable interest from researchers in 
recent years, a lot of this research has been focussed particularly on security and 
privacy (Birk, 2011; Casey & Stellatos, 2008; Chen, Paxson, & Katz, 2010; Joint, 
Baker, & Eccles, 2009), possibly because cloud security seems to be the most 
frequently cited concern on the part of business leaders surveyed by organisations 
such as Gartner (Brodkin, 2008) and IDC (Mullins, 2010). 
Research into cloud forensic investigation has tended to focus on two key areas: 
the use of the cloud in aiding investigations; and the investigation of incidents 
involving the cloud. The present text focuses on the investigation of the cloud 
rather than the use of the cloud in aiding investigations. 
Some of the complexities of the acquisition process where data is in the cloud, 
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have previously been outlined by Navetta (2009), Shipley (2009), Taylor, 
Haggerty, Gresty, and Lamb (2011), and Reilly, Wren, and Berry (2011). Taylor 
et al. (2011) have outlined further complexities of cloud investigation and Reilly 
et al. (2011) note the difficulties in applying guidelines to a cloud investigation 
and also the benefits that cloud computing may provide in assisting an 
investigation wherein the tremendous storage offered by the cloud could be used 
to store digital forensic images and the computational power of the cloud may 
assist in cracking passwords and in processing the case. Birk (2011) has explored 
some of the complexities of investigating various cloud platforms and presents a 
very useful insight into the problems encountered in investigating Software as a 
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Information as a Service (IaaS). 
Where cloud systems incorporate elements of virtualisation, there are particular 
benefits which have been outlined by Reilly et al. (2011) and Bem & Huebner 
(2007), who note that the imaging of virtual systems (whether live or off-line) can 
be easier in comparison with normal non-virtualised systems. Birk (2011) notes 
that the snapshot feature which was introduced to a number of hypervisors (Xen, 
VMware, etc.) can be the equivalent of a forensic image of the cloud storage 
system. 
Whereas there is some research conducted into the investigation of cloud systems, 
Beebe (2009) has noted that there is still considerable scope for further research 
and the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) has 
highlighted forensics and evidence gathering mechanisms as priority areas of 
research (ENISA, 2009). 
This study focuses on the issue of digital forensic guidelines, more specifically the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) ‘Good Practice Guide for 
Computer-Based Electronic Evidence’ guidelines (referred to hereon simply as 
‘the ACPO guidelines’ or ‘the ACPO principles’) and the challenges in applying 
them to a cloud investigation. 
The ACPO guidelines consist of a set of four principles and then the detailed 
guidelines, they are aimed specifically at ‘police officers, police staff, and private 
sector investigators working in conjunction with law enforcement’ (ACPO, 
1998). The original guidelines were developed in consultation with a digital 
forensics consultancy called 7Safe (7Safe, 2011) and whilst they were originally 
aimed specifically at the law enforcement agencies in the UK, they have come 
into general use throughout many digital forensic investigations.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We begin in section 0 by presenting 
a short review of the ACPO guidelines. The study proceeds to exploring issues 
relating to the interpretation of the ACPO guidelines and the case – if any, for 
reviewing these to include cloud computing. The cloud models and the challenges 
of investigating public clouds (versus private clouds) are analysed next in section 
3. This is followed in section 4 by an analysis of each of the ACPO principles and 
their application in cloud investigations, we proceed in the same section to 
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analyse some of the particular problems and challenges posed by public cloud 
investigations and the contextual application of the ACPO guidelines. 
2. INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE ACPO GUIDELINES IN CLOUD FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS 
The ACPO ‘Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence’ 
guidelines have become the standard for UK based digital investigations. They 
have also become accepted in most other EU countries (Mason, 2008) and for 
many law enforcement agencies around the world (Janes, 2006) - most of which 
have no similar guidelines relating to the collection and management of electronic 
evidence. 
The ACPO guidelines however are not universally accepted, Belgium and the 
USA are two notable exceptions. In the USA, there are specific guidelines relating 
to evidence acquisition from mobile devices (Jansen & Ayers, 2007), electronic 
evidence seizure guidelines for the United States Secret Services (USSS, 2006), 
electronic evidence seizure guidelines for US law enforcement (USDOJ, 2009), 
and, in the past, there have even been guidelines for Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) (USISPA, 2003). 
It is beyond the remit of this study to explore the content and scope of all these 
respective guidelines, however by considering the ACPO guidelines as an 
example, the digital forensics community should be better placed to contextualise 
some of the arguments presented herein. Furthermore, there are some views that 
the ACPO guidelines are more matured and perhaps the most practical of the 
published guidelines (Casey, 2011), we therefore consider that it may be pertinent 
to use these guidelines as an example and proceed to consider some of the 
complexities in applying the ACPO principles to cloud investigations. 
Adoption of the ACPO guidelines in a UK investigation ensures that a legally 
accepted process is followed in the investigation. The importance of robust 
guidelines was demonstrated in 1997 (before the guidelines were published) when 
the case of Police Sergeant Gurpal Virdi vs Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 
demonstrated the repercussions of failing to follow best practice guidelines 
(MPA, 2001). Turner (2001) notes that in this case the handling of computer 
evidence was inadequate and had there been such guidance at the time of the 
investigation, it is likely that the mistakes of this landmark case might have been 
avoided. 
Whilst the guidelines were developed within the area of law enforcement, they 
can be applied to any investigation that may involve digital evidence, numerous 
private companies (CFA, 2009; Disklabs, 2008; 7Safe, 2011) have adopted these 
as a standard. Jones & Valli (2009) have highlighted the benefits of this approach 
by warning that what may start as a civil litigation inquiry may ultimately become 
a criminal investigation. 
The traditional approach to a digital forensic investigation involves seizing 
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computer equipment such as a personal computer and extracting evidence from 
the device in a forensically sound manner. This approach generally involves the 
investigation of equipment that is tangible and normally easily isolated from a 
network or intranet. Where the device is not easily isolated, network forensics and 
real time (live) forensic techniques can be used to investigate the device and some 
of the network components.  
The ACPO  guidelines have previously been updated to reflect the increased use 
of home networks and mobile devices. The advent of cloud computing represents 
a significant development of technology and raises the question as to whether 
future versions of the guidelines should be updated to reflect best practice in 
conducting cloud investigations.  
Owen & Thomas (2009) have criticised the lack of specific guidance for the 
investigation of mobile devices. They argue that the integrity of evidence 
extracted from the device can be jeopardised if issues facing an investigator are 
not covered in the guidelines. However this raises particular questions about the 
depth that the guidelines can be expected to cover and also whether a cloud 
investigation could be jeopardised due to its lack of coverage in the guidelines.  
The difficulties in applying the ACPO guidelines in a cloud investigation and 
achieving a successful subsequent prosecution have previously been outlined by 
Reilly et al. (2011) and also by Taylor et al. (2011). Taylor et al., believe that the 
guidelines: 
cover crime scenes on the internet, in terms of the forensic examination 
of physical devices connected to the Internet, and the necessity in some 
instances of capturing evidence directly from the Internet possibly 
during ‘live’ interaction with a suspect or by capturing live website 
content. The use of checkpoints might be useful in order to make live 
systems easier to analyse. The ACPO guide also provides advice 
regarding the difficulty in capturing evidence where target machine(s) 
may be sited outside UK jurisdiction. 
What Taylor et al. (2011) seem to suggest is that the guidelines are sufficiently 
generic for an investigator to be able to contextualise them, this is a view echoed 
by Marshall (2008) as well who adds that the terms ‘law enforcement’ (from 
Principle 1) and ‘case officer’ (from Principle 4) could be substituted for 
‘investigator’ and ‘manager’ respectively, showing that the principles can easily 
be adapted for a commercial investigation and presumably a cloud investigation.  
Mobile device technology has changed significantly from the point it was 
incorporated within the guidelines to today, however if the changes are taken out 
of their historical context they are quite incremental. This incremental 
development becomes significant over time and has resulted in an increased use 
of phone apps, some of which give users access to a vast amount of cloud storage 
(Evernote, 2010) and processing power providing more sophisticated and flexible 
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applications (Qamar et al., 2010). 
Should the guidelines be technology specific and receive revisions with each 
incremental development or when a 'significant' change has taken place? If it is to 
be the latter, then how do we determine when a change is significant? The 
question of whether cloud computing is a significant change for investigators 
might be determined by the number of cases being dealt with. As yet there seems 
little empirical data which confirms the level of cloud investigations being 
undertaken by law enforcement agencies.  
Given the global context (which is not of course new), it may be useful to 
consider a proposal for developing a set of international guidelines which may in 
turn be more appropriate for investigating digital investigation cases which so 
clearly cross jurisdictional boundaries. Such work has been undertaken in other 
contexts (Hesser, 2010). 
3. THE PROBLEMS WITH INVESTIGATING THE PUBLIC CLOUD  
The way in which an investigation will be conducted (in terms of complexity and 
procedures followed) will depend largely on whether the cloud under 
investigation is a public or private cloud. Mell and Grance (2011) and NIST 
(2011) defines three service models (SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS) and four main 
deployment models (public, private, community or hybrid).  
This research focuses primarily on the public cloud infrastructure although some 
of the issues discussed herein will apply to one or more of the deployment 
models. Private clouds are a more popular way in which to outsource IT through 
tailor made contracts and are generally easier to investigate in comparison with 
public clouds. In a private cloud, the data stores, IT infrastructure (servers and 
network components) and the personnel are in known locations and are generally 
accessible. The organisation is generally familiar with the applications used to 
access the data stores and manage the servers, they are familiar with the audit trail 
systems used (assuming that they are used of course). The personnel involved in 
managing the services are in the employ (either directly or contractually) of the 
company and in general there is a lot more certainty surrounding the 
investigation. 
Public clouds are owned by an organisation – a Cloud Services Provider (CSP) 
that sells its cloud computing services to public and business users. Public clouds 
have the potential to be the more popular implementation of the cloud (Armburst, 
2009) particularly as they are more universally available. 
Badger, Grance, Patt-Corner, and Voas (2011) suggest that where SaaS is used as 
the cloud service, the investigative responsibility lies with the CSP, in an IaaS 
model with the subscriber (with perhaps some collaboration with the provider) 
and in a PaaS model the responsibility may be split between the two. 
The primary difficulty of investigating a public cloud is highlighted by Taylor et 
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al. (2011) who add that the problem is not that data may be located remotely, but 
being able to prove actus reus, i.e., that of “a specific person undertaking a 
specific action at a specified time, date and place”. This in turn is related to a 
number of issues which arise primarily out of the uncertainty of the location of 
data stores, the ownership of those data stores and platform related issues more 
specifically because: 
 A public cloud storage infrastructure may consist of dozens of 
server farms/data stores, some of which may be dynamically 
routed and stored, i.e. the data is not held in a fixed 
geographical location. There are numerous reasons for the 
dynamic routing and storing of data, some of which are 
highlighted by Qureshi (2008) who outlines economic benefits 
to be achieved therein. The investigator needs to identify the 
precise locations of the data stores so as to be able to acquire 
the evidence source, this may be very difficult in such an 
environment. 
 The movement of data makes it difficult to develop an accurate 
timeline, this is a problem partially related to the way in which 
metadata is stored/managed. The file metadata does not store 
information relating to file movement, how therefore would an 
investigator identify the movements of data over a period of a 
month for the purpose of developing the timeline from the 
metadata? If anything a cloud investigation requires 
heightened awareness to assist in being able to develop a 
timeline, any evidence found on the local machine pointing to 
artefacts that might have been accessed in the cloud has to be 
correlated with the evidence found on a local machine pointing 
to that interaction. Clock synchronisation across data centres 
may also impact on the ability to develop an accurate timeline. 
4. APPLYING THE ACPO PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC CLOUD 
INVESTIGATIONS 
Given the difficulties in investigating the cloud and the views relating to the 
applicability (or contextualisation) of the ACPO guidelines, we now proceed to 
exploring the central question of this study by analysing each of the four ACPO 
principles in the context of a public cloud investigation and asking whether each 
of the four principles can be upheld in a cloud investigation. 
4.1 Implications on data integrity due to delay related loss of control 
(Principle 1) 
From the moment the investigation begins to the point that physical seizure of the 
data store takes place by the relevant investigator/case technician, a significant 
time gap may have elapsed, particularly if the data is located in another legal 
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jurisdiction. Effectively the investigator loses control of the investigation for a 
short period – an issue previously highlighted by Cunningham (2009) and Shipley 
(2009). This increases the risk of the evidence becoming corrupted, a ‘live data 
store’ may have changed significantly in the interim period. The first principle of 
the ACPO guidelines states that: 
no action taken by law enforcement agencies or their agents should 
change data held on a computer or storage media which may 
subsequently be relied upon in court 
The challenge presented by the first ACPO principle in a cloud investigation in 
comparison with a normal investigation, is the in the remoteness of the data 
source and it is this remoteness that takes some control away from the 
investigator. 
Furthermore, the issue under investigation may not be a crime in the local 
jurisdiction (discussed further in §0) therefore placing no compulsion on the CSP 
to cooperate. Should the CSP be willing to cooperate, they may place very 
specific restrictions on the investigation particularly as the data store to be 
investigated may contain data belonging to other organisations outside of the 
investigation. This issue has recently been extended by Badger et al. (2011) who 
point to concerns regarding the release of audit logs and log data wherein some of 
that data also may belong to third parties which are not within the scope of the 
investigation. 
At this juncture it is useful to note that there is scope for CSPs to collectively 
begin establishing forensic readiness plans and establishing measures to 
demonstrate that they are capable of conducting sound investigations. A forensic 
readiness plan would: 
 Better guide the investigation 
 Answer some of the issued raised in this study 
 Become a key selling point for service providers as the cloud 
market matures and competition increases 
In the absence of a forensic readiness plan, and given that the investigator is 
endeavouring to acquire (image) the data source at the earliest opportunity, the 
following alternatives are presented: 
 Relying on a case technician at the CSP to properly acquire the 
data store 
 Achieving mutual agreement with the CSP to involve a local 3rd 
party case technician in the investigation 
 Performing a remote acquisition of the data store.  
Often the remote acquisition (given the nature of the data source) may have to be 
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a live remote acquisition – a prospect that has hitherto perhaps been given less 
consideration. The issue of live forensics has previously been highlighted as an 
area of considerable growth (Adelstein, 2006), the growth of cloud computing 
makes this more likely in such investigation cases. 
We can summarise that whilst it is possible to expedite the imaging of the data 
store, it is likely that there will be a delay in acquiring that data store due to its 
remoteness and that this is not as a result of direct action taken by the investigator. 
4.2 Competency (Principle 2) 
The involvement of a third party in the investigation raises particular concerns 
regarding the competency of the third party investigator. The second principle 
states that: 
In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original 
data held on a computer or on storage media, that person must be 
competent to do so and be able to give evidence explaining the 
relevance and the implications of their actions. 
The issue of competency in this context relates to two particular points – 
competency in giving evidence and competency in being able to handle and 
investigate the evidence. The former is less of an issue as a competent investigator 
should be able to give evidence relating to that investigation – notwithstanding 
some of the challenges therein which are discussed later in this section. 
With the absence of an internationally recognised standard, the competency of an 
agent conducting any part of the investigation overseas could be brought into 
scrutiny; however we argue that the issue of competency in a cloud investigation 
is not that different to a normal localised investigation and that it should be just as 
easy to demonstrate competency in this scenario. 
Competency in the digital forensics domain can generally be demonstrated 
through any or a combination of: 
 Advanced academic study in a relevant field 
 Advanced professional/vendor certification 
 Experience in the field 
 Demonstrable adherence to recognised standards 
All except the last can be demonstrated by 3
rd
 parties in the investigation, 
however, the issue of recognised standards in digital investigation (or in this case 
a lack thereof) is both a UK problem as well as an international one and is 
therefore not unique in this context. The closest that there may be in terms of an 
international standard may be ISO 17025 which some UK law enforcement 
agencies require.  
The case for the requirement of an international standard in digital forensics has 
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been well made (Barbara, 2005; Jones, 2004; Meyers & Rogers, 2004; Schwerha, 
2008; Yasinsac et al., 2003; Young, 2007). The second consultation draft of The 
Forensic Science Regulator’s Codes of Practice and Conduct, states that “The 
forensic examination of computers and telephones is a common aspect of police 
investigations leading to the production of intelligence and evidence. This is a 
forensic process and must be subject to the same standards as other forensic 
processes” (Home Office, 2010). The Digital Forensics Specialist Group has 
identified digital forensics as a growing area of police business (in the UK) which 
specifically suffers from a lack of scientific quality standards, stating that police, 
digital forensic practitioners and academic scientists have expressed a need for 
both “process standards, governing the production of digital forensic evidence 
and standards of individual competence” (Home Office, 2008, section 6.1.2).  
The absence of national and international standardisation in this area does not 
mean that competency cannot be proven, we have already highlighted above that 
competency can be demonstrated through other means. Three further issues 
relating to competency do however apply in the context of a cloud investigation: 
 Extended technical competency 
 Extended competency in giving evidence 
 The complexity of a multitude of bespoke/customised/virtualised 
systems 
A case manager should be able to demonstrate ‘additional competency’ to what 
s/he might already be used to so as to demonstrate a clear understanding of cloud 
computing technology, the legal context and the challenges arising thereof of a 
cloud investigation and in further demonstrating that all precautions and 
considerations were taken throughout the investigation. 
Whereas the explanation of technical IT related concepts to juries may already be 
an issue, there are further challenges presented in being able to explain the 
technicalities of cloud computing and most importantly the technicalities of 
extracting evidence from the cloud to a jury. 
The issue of competency is complicated somewhat because the investigator may 
be dealing with complex and often bespoke (customised) systems some of which 
may be virtualised (although one would assume that they support a recognised file 
system). Taylor et al. (2011) have noted that the cross platform nature of cloud 
computing means that the tools used to undertake an investigation must be able to 
support these platforms, such tools may not exist and there becomes an increased 
requirement for investigator training. 
We conclude that the issue of competency in a cloud investigation can be easily 
adhered to but that an investigator needs to demonstrate extended competence in 
understanding cloud technology and then subsequently being able to explain this 
to a jury.  
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4.3 Maintaining an Audit Trail (Principle 3) 
The distributed nature of the data stores presents problems in being able to record 
an accurate audit trail. In a cloud investigation the investigator may need to access 
and image multiple data stores which are held in separate geographic locations 
and jurisdictions. Realistically these may need to be accessed and imaged by local 
case technicians as discussed in §0. The third ACPO principle requires that: 
An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer-
based electronic evidence should be created and preserved. An 
independent third party should be able to examine those processes and 
achieve the same result.  
In the context of a cloud investigation, this principle presents a challenge and the 
case manager would need to maintain and consolidate a consistent audit trail 
between the case technicians and his/her own audit trail of the investigation. In 
such instances, it may useful to formulate a specific agreement through Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) protocols which may provide an opportunity 
for declaring and agreeing the principles for the investigation at the outset. 
4.4 Legal Jurisdiction (Principle 4) 
There are very particular legal complexities (beyond the scope of this article’s 
remit) presented by an international cloud investigation. Some of these have been 
highlighted by Frowen (2009) who identifies the ‘legal and legislative hurdles’ 
facing those involved in international investigations. We highlight some of the 
issues briefly herein. The fourth principles states that: 
The person in charge of the investigation (the case officer) has overall 
responsibility for ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered 
to 
This raises the question as to whether the spirit of this principle refers to the UK 
law, the overseas law or both. The fourth ACPO principle becomes more difficult 
to apply particularly where the issue under investigation does not contravene local 
jurisdiction. 
International investigations involving a G8 country would normally involve a 
request through the appropriate law enforcement agency (for instance, Serious 
Organised Crime Agency) who would issue a request for their counterparts in the 
G8 country to secure the data (thereby generating the appropriate summons, 
subpoena, search warrant etc.). If the country is not a member of the G8, there 
may be specific trans-national agreements between the two countries amounting 
to the same. An officer of the law in the local jurisdiction would enter the 
premises (of the CSP) with the corresponding local warrant or authority.  
Some of the issues outlined herein could probably be resolved somewhat if there 
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were clear guidelines which more specifically directed a cloud investigation, as 
we have established, no such guidelines presently exist. 
The issue of ensuring that the law is adhered to is a particular problem in a cloud 
investigation and often the best that an investigator might be able to achieve is to 
ensure that the local law (at the origin of the investigation) is indeed adhered to. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We set out in this manuscript to consider whether the core ACPO principles could 
be applied and upheld within a cloud investigation scenario. Within that context 
we sought also to consider some of the challenges involved in applying these 
principles.  
We have recognised that there is a lack of specific guidelines for cloud 
investigation and that upholding the ACPO principles in particular within the 
context of a cloud investigation is problematic for a number of reasons cited 
herein but in brief include: complexities relating to the distribution of the data 
stores, associated problems with metadata, a general lack of control over the 
investigation and the problems associated with maintaining an audit trail. 
We have suggested that some of the issues may be offset by relying on third party 
investigators and with the investigators (whether third party or not) needing to 
demonstrate additional competency in understanding cloud technology and being 
able to competently perform the investigation notwithstanding its remoteness. The 
issue of the audit trail can be overcome through increased collaboration, 
organisation and mutual agreement between the investigators.  
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